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Abstract
This study looks at the experiences of organizations that have fallen victim to ransomware attacks.
Using quantitative and qualitative data of 55 ransomware cases drawn from 50 organizations in the
UK and North America, we assessed the severity of the crypto-ransomware attacks experienced
and looked at various factors to test if they had an influence on the degree of severity. An organiza-
tion’s size was found to have no effect on the degree of severity of the attack, but the sector was
found to be relevant, with private sector organizations feeling the pain much more severely than
those in the public sector. Moreover, an organization’s security posture influences the degree of se-
verity of a ransomware attack. We did not find that the attack target (i.e. human or machine) or the
crypto-ransomware propagation class had any significant bearing on the severity of the outcome,
but attacks that were purposefully directed at specific victims wreaked more damage than oppor-
tunistic ones.
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Introduction
In recent years, Europol’s annual Internet Organised Crime Threat
Assessment report has consistently identified ransomware as a top
priority; their latest bulletin states that ‘ransomware remains one
of the, if not the, most dominant threats, especially for public
and private organisations within as well as outside Europe’ [1].
Furthermore, as starkly evidenced by an international survey of
5000 IT managers, the incidence of ransomware attacks is growing
exponentially [2]. Similar trends have been observed by government
and law enforcement bodies [3, 4]. Ransomware attacks can poten-
tially generate substantial financial rewards for offenders, but the
ransom – which in most cases is not paid – is just a fraction of the
overall cost of the attack in terms of reputational damage and loss
of business [3, 5].
Since ransomware first arrived on the scene in a major way
about the year 2013, the volume of academic literature produced on
this topic has mushroomed. Important advances such as sophisti-
cated detection methods and innovative intrusion prevention sys-
tems have been put forward. Organizations are advised to
implement effective security education, introduce policies and tech-
nical controls, install antivirus software, promote strong e-mail hy-
giene, upgrade old systems, execute regular patching, apply the
‘least privileges’ approach, segregate the network perimeter and im-
plement effective backup practices [6, 7]. Although the aforemen-
tioned types of work are of tremendous importance to a
preventative strategy, they are not by themselves sufficient. This is
because most of the research on ransomware to date has focused pri-
marily on its technical aspects, with comparatively little attention
being given to understanding the socio-technical side of the attack
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or the characteristics of organizations [8]. So, while there is a strong
emphasis on developing ransomware countermeasures, there is a
lack of studies that examine the real experiences of organizations
that have actually fallen victim to ransomware attacks.
It may be tempting to assume certain things about what makes
an organization more or less vulnerable to an attack, but we should
not be so presumptuous. Although research on cybercrime victimiza-
tion has significantly expanded over the past two decades, the ma-
jority of studies focus on individual-level offences such as online
bullying, harassment and stalking. Holt and Bossler [9] make the
point that for some types of cybercrime, such as malware and ran-
somware, our understanding of what causes individuals and organi-
zations to fall victim is not well developed. Our work addresses this
limitation by focusing on ransomware crime and collecting data
from the actual victims of ransomware.
Generally, the risk of cybercrime victimization has been
addressed by studying characteristics of the offender [10], the victim
[11] and the crime itself [12]. Our article focuses on the latter two
and is motivated by several calls in the literature to better under-
stand typical victims of ransomware attacks, with a view towards
developing solutions that prevent or mitigate this sinister problem
[9, 13, 14].
To date, only a small number of studies have directly looked at
the experiences of organizations that have fallen victim to
ransomware. Of these few (see Table 1), the majority consider
things at a rather cursory level. Our study, which is based on a sub-
stantial sample of 55 ransomware attacks and draws upon qualita-
tive and quantitative data, helps to address this gap in the literature
by presenting detailed findings on the antecedents and consequences
of actual ransomware attacks within 50 organizations. Our objec-
tives were to
i. Assess the degree of severity of ransomware attacks within
organizations;
ii. Explore how characteristics of the organization and characteris-
tics of the attack affect the severity of the outcome.
Review of prior work
Within the literature on cybercrime in general, there have been vari-
ous efforts to understand the factors that make individuals more
prone to becoming victims. Drawing upon Lifestyle Theory and
Routine Activity Theory, Agustina [23] proposes several behaviour-
al and environmental factors that should, in theory at least, elevate
the risk of being victimized. In practice, however, as found by Ngo
and Paternoster [24], these theories do not hold up to empirical scru-
tiny. Our work differs from these previous studies in two ways: first,
we are looking not at cybercrime in general, but specifically at
Table 1. Previous empirical studies of ransomware attacks on organizations
Authors Country Method Sample Main findings
Choi et al. [15] USA Quantitative analysis of sec-
ondary data
13 reported attacks on police depart-
ments from 2013 to 2016
Online lifestyle and cybersecurity
stance contribute to ransomware
victimization
Zhao et al. [16] USA Mixed methods case study:
questionnaire and
interviews
Medical students and surgeons in a
hospital that experienced a
SamSam ransomware attack (29
survey respondents; 8
interviewees)
Students who are ‘digital natives’
were seriously stressed by lack of
access to electronic resources and




USA Mixed methods case study:
questionnaire and
interviews
Staff and students in a large univer-
sity that experienced a ransom-
ware attack at a critical time (150
survey respondents; 30
interviewees)
It took several days to recover basic
services and the after-effects on
user productivity were felt for a
considerable time afterward.
Substantial data loss and emotion-
al effects on staff.
Hull et al. [18] UK Mixed methods: question-
naire and interviews
46 questionnaire respondents and 8
interviews (university staff, stu-
dents and SMEs)
Universities are more likely to be
attacked than SMEs; ransomware
victims only had basic defences in
place
Shinde et al. [19] The Netherlands Mixed methods: question-
naire and interviews
Snowball sample of 23 individuals
and 2 semi-structured interviews
Most ransomware attacks use an
untargeted ‘shotgun’ approach; se-
curity awareness among victims
was low
Ioanid et al. [20] Romania Questionnaire Survey of 123 SMEs Organization size and turnover is
positively correlated with number




Ireland Brief interviews Three organizations that had suf-
fered attacks
E-mail filtering software had been
removed because of the overhead
it was placing on IT departments;
in the wake of attacks, security
training and awareness pro-
grammes were ramped up.
Riglietti [22] Not stated Content analysis of
discussions
301 posts extracted from four online
security blogs
Content analysis technique can in-
crease our understanding of secur-
ity challenges within organizations
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ransomware attacks; secondly, our focus is not on individual vic-
tims, but rather on organizations.
Although several reports [1–4] suggest that the number of ran-
somware attacks against businesses continues to rise steadily, it is
hard to form any clear sense of the true extent of ransomware
attacks. The difficulty of accurately measuring and comparing
cybercrime rates has been remarked upon by Furnell et al. [25].
Statistics about the incidence of ransomware attacks vary wildly. In
an international study based on 574 participants across 77 coun-
tries, BCI [26] reported that 31% of respondents had been afflicted
by ransomware. In contrast, a large-scale survey of Internet users in
Germany revealed that only 3.6% of individuals had suffered a ran-
somware attack [27]. Simoiu et al. [5] estimated that about 2–3% of
their sample of 1180 American adults were hit by ransomware be-
tween 2016 and 2017. Similarly, Ioanid et al. [20] reported that 2%
of their sample of 103 Romanian small-to-medium enterprises
(SMEs) were affected by the WannaCry attack that year. Against
those low incidence rates, Hull et al. [18] found that as many as
61% of UK respondents had experienced at least one attack, and
Shinde et al. [19] reported that 20% of respondents to their survey
in the Netherlands were victims of ransomware, although it must be
acknowledged that both those studies were based on quite small
samples. All of these conflicting survey findings create a rather
muddled picture. This, of course, can be put down to differences in
sampling methods, response rates, temporal factors and units of ana-
lysis, but our essential point is this: it is generally agreed that ran-
somware presents a grave threat and has adversely affected many
organizations, yet we know very little about the experiences of
organizations that were attacked or the root causes that left them
open to a successful violation.
There are very few empirical studies of the impact of ransom-
ware within organizations or the factors that make organizations
vulnerable. Al-Rimy et al. [28] present a literature survey of ransom-
ware threat success factors, but the scope of their work extends only
to infection vectors and enabling technologies (i.e. cryptography
techniques, payment methods, ransomware development kits). They
do not consider any organizational or socio-technical factors.
Our extensive search of the literature revealed just a handful of
studies that looked directly at the experiences of organizations that
were victims of ransomware (see Table 1). To summarize the key
findings of these studies: ransomware attacks had major financial
and emotional impact on victims, and the common factors that led
to the attacks seemed to be a lack of security education or diligence,
with organization type and size also emerging as possible factors
impacting the likelihood of an attack.
Byrne and Thorpe [21] observe that ‘there is a gap in the litera-
ture with regards to examining the issue [of ransomware] from a
company’s perspective and that of its user base.’ Our study aims to
make a contribution towards addressing this gap. In the next sec-
tions, we present a number of factors that we believe might affect
the vulnerability of an organization to a ransomware attack, as well
as characteristics of the attack weapon and method that could affect
the severity of impact.
Hypotheses development
Organization characteristics: size and sector
As with so much of the reported facts and figures pertaining to ran-
somware, there is disagreement as to whether an organization’s size
makes it more or less susceptible to attack. An international survey
conducted by BCI [26] found that ransomware attacks are a
substantially more common problem for large enterprises than they
are for SMEs. However, contradictory findings are reported by
Beazley [27] who state that SMEs were disproportionately hit by
ransomware attacks in 2018, with 71% of all infections occurring
within such organizations.
Many SMEs based in the UK believe that they are not likely to
be targeted by ransomware attacks; while they place high value on
the importance of IT to their business, they are generally not wor-
ried about the threat of data loss [29, 30]. SMEs, by their entrepre-
neurial nature, are more likely to engage in risk-taking behaviour
[31]. However, SMEs may underestimate the value to hackers of
their information systems and may not realize that they could be tar-
geted as a hop to gain entry into their partners’ networks. As Smith
[32] puts it, ‘even if you think your company has nothing worth
stealing, losing access to all your data is no longer an unlikely event.’
Kurpjuhn [33] makes the point that SMEs must accept that they are
exposed to similar levels of risk as large enterprises but have lower
budgets and lesser resources to address those risks.
An argument could be made that larger organizations, simply be-
cause they employ more people, are at greater risk of infection due
to human error; it only takes one reckless act by a single individual
to compromise an entire network. Although not quite the same
thing, Bergmann et al. [34] found no correlation between the size of
a household and the rate of cybercrime victimization experienced by
members of that household. How that finding would scale up to
larger units in a non-domestic setting is a matter of conjecture, but it
seems reasonable to assume that the potential for human error
increases relative to the size of the unit.
The purpose of our study is not to determine the relative likeli-
hood of attacks against SMEs or large enterprises. We assume that
the probability of attack is much the same, given the indiscriminate
nature of ransomware attacks. What we are interested in looking at
is the relative impact that attacks have on SMEs as opposed to large
enterprises. We therefore explore the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1a: An organization’s size influences the impact se-
verity of a ransomware attack.
In addition to looking at the effect of organizational size on the im-
pact of the attack, we also want to consider if the sector (i.e. private
or public) makes a difference. Prior literature suggests that public
organizations, especially universities, hospitals, municipal offices
and police departments, are especially prone to attack and have cer-
tain characteristics that make them easier targets and more likely to
be hit hard [15, 18]. On the contrary, private organizations, espe-
cially SMEs or those in customer-facing functions, have much to
lose and may not be as capable or as well-resourced as public sector
organizations when it comes to withstanding a ransomware attack
[35]. In view of the differences between public and private sector
organizations, we put forward the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1b: An organization’s sector influences the impact se-
verity of a ransomware attack.
Security posture
Because ransomware combines technical and social characteristics
to create its impact, we explore the organizational victim responses
to attacks through the lens of ‘security posture’. Security posture is
defined as ‘the security status of an enterprise’s networks, informa-
tion, and systems based on information assurance resources (e.g.,
people, hardware, software, policies) and capabilities in place to
manage the defense of the enterprise and to react as the situation






/cybersecurity/article/6/1/tyaa023/6047253 by guest on 16 April 2021
changes’ [36]. Prior research into ransomware attacks on organiza-
tions shows that a lack of basic security practices, or failure to com-
ply with them, was a common failing [15, 18]. Organizations that
do not have adequate and effective backup strategies are much more
likely to end up having to pay the ransom to retrieve their data [15,
28]. Connolly and Wall [8] developed a taxonomy of ransomware
countermeasures, emphasizing a multi-layered approach in protect-
ing organizations against ransomware.
While technical defence mechanisms are very important, so too
is individual behaviour and good ‘online lifestyle’. Inadequate care
by employees when choosing to open e-mail attachments or hyper-
links, downloading ‘free’ versions of software or cracked games,
browsing adult content or illegal sports live streams, and installing
apps from untrusted sources are all examples of poor online hygiene
that can increase the risk of a ransomware infection. Riglietti [28]
observed that ‘looking at what users say, avoiding infection appears
to be a matter of spreading the right security culture within an or-
ganisation rather than a technical issue.’ A key part of this is educa-
tion and awareness [37, 38]. In their studies of ransomware victims,
Shinde et al. [19] and Zhang-Kennedy et al. [27] both observed a
tendency by employees to assume that cybersecurity was essentially
the responsibility of the IT Department. While it is to be expected
that the IT Department should take the lead on security and actively
promote a strong posture, there is an onus on individuals to utilize
good personal security practices and not engage in irresponsible
behaviour.
The importance of having good procedures and sticking to them
has long been preached, but often not practiced. In the era of ran-
somware, the penalty for being sloppy or undisciplined when it
comes to cybersecurity is potentially very high. For this reason, we
wanted to compare the severity of ransomware attacks experienced
by organizations with strong security postures to those of organiza-
tions that have weaker levels of security. It is with this aim that we
propose the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1c: An organization’s security posture influences the
impact severity of a ransomware attack.
Crypto-ransomware propagation class
Since crypto-ransomware was incapable of propagating on networks
prior to 2013, we decided to create a simple taxonomy according to
the degree of infectiousness (see Table 2). Different propagation
classes of crypto-ransomware may have a lesser or greater effect on
the outcome of a crypto-ransomware attack as a result of the volume
of infection spread.
What we term ‘Generation I’ crypto-ransomware was not par-
ticularly effective in extorting money due to several technological
shortcomings, such as the use of easy-to-break encryption, ineffi-
cient management of decryption keys and limited propagation capa-
bilities. It is highly likely that Generation I variants are obsolete.
We refer to variants such as CryptoWall, CryptoLocker and
CryptoDefence as ‘Generation II’. These forms of ransomware ini-
tially penetrate networks via desktops or laptops and subsequently
take advantage of the local user security context to spread via net-
work paths, encrypting network shares that the user has ‘write’ ac-
cess to. They can also encrypt devices physically connected to the
infected machine.
What we refer to as ‘Generation III.a’ malware are those such as
Samas and BitPaymer that tend to breach networks via vulnerabil-
ities found in servers [e.g. a weak password in Remote Desktop
Protocol (RDP)]. Once inside the server, attackers manually and/or
automatically search for various weaknesses within the network
(e.g. poor authentication controls, a flat network structure, the lack
of network visibility and detection mechanisms). Such vulnerabil-
ities permit attackers to stay undetected and hijack multiple devices
and the entire network in some cases. Crypto-worms like WannaCry
(‘Generation III.b’ in our classification) have a similar devastating
effect, the chief difference being that they take advantage exclusively
of software vulnerabilities in order to propagate.
We are interested in comparing the experiences of victims of
Generation II attacks against those of Generation III attacks. The
following hypothesis is therefore suggested:
Hypothesis 2a: The crypto-ransomware propagation class influ-
ences the impact severity of a ransomware attack.
Attack type and target
As regards the type of crypto-ransomware attacks, the literature dis-
tinguishes between ‘opportunistic’ and ‘targeted’ incidents [39]. In
opportunistic attacks, ransomware is distributed via mass e-mails
with the help of powerful botnets that can send millions of messages
per day. Offenders do not target any victim in particular but attempt
to infect as many machines as possible via a so-called ‘spray-and-
pray’ distribution method. Typically, victims are asked to pay sums
between UK£300 and UK£500, an amount that many organizations
or individuals can afford to pay, given that the loss of data is un-
bearable for the victim. Attackers thus attempt to make profit via
mass infections. On the contrary, targeted attacks require time and
preparation, and offenders typically penetrate networks via spear-
phishing or server vulnerabilities. Attackers ask for larger ransoms
compared to opportunistic attacks, in the range of 35–100 bitcoins
(approximate current value UK£135 000–385 000). Therefore, the
consequences of targeted attacks are potentially more severe [40].
Accordingly, we form this hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2b: The attack type, i.e. opportunistic or targeted,
influences the impact severity of a ransomware attack.
Another distinction that can be made is between the nature of the
target, i.e. ‘human’ or ‘machine’. If the machine is the target, the at-
tack vector will typically be a software vulnerability or weak device
passwords, whereas if a human is the target, then the attack vector
will be an e-mail message. Cybercriminals can go to considerable
rounds to build detailed profiles of their victims before luring them
with personalized messages containing malicious attachments or
hyperlinks [15, 18]. Since numerous sources allocate a lot of blame
to human error and claim that human mistakes cost organizations
huge amounts of money [41, 42], it would be interesting to find out
if this is the case with crypto-ransomware attacks. We therefore
examine the following hypothesis in order to compare attacks aimed
at machines against those aimed at humans:
Hypothesis 2c: The attack target, i.e. human or machine, influen-
ces the impact severity of a ransomware attack
Research method and analysis of findings
This study used a mixed methods approach following an explora-
tory sequential design [43]. Phase 1 was qualitative. In order to as-
sess the degree of severity of ransomware attacks (our first
objective), we required a measurement instrument. A literature
search revealed that there are no readily available tools for this par-
ticular purpose. Since crypto-ransomware incidents entail some
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unique consequences (e.g. encrypted data, disabled systems), we
could not use substitutes from other cybercrime studies; the assess-
ment instrument had to be specific to crypto-ransomware attacks.
Hence, the aim of Phase 1 was to inductively develop an Impact
Assessment Instrument (grounded in empirical data) that can be
used to effectively evaluate the severity of crypto-ransomware
attacks on organizations in our sample. In Phase 2, we gathered add-
itional quantitative data so as to be able to statistically test our
hypotheses.
The Ethics Committee at the University of Leeds approved this
research. Consent forms were signed by all study participants. All
necessary precautions were followed to ensure the anonymity of
study participants and the confidentiality of collected data. The ma-
jority of participants were from the UK but there were also a few
from North America. Where the names of organizations are subse-
quently referred to in this article, aliases are used to protect the ano-
nymity of respondents (see Appendix 1). Additionally, interviewees
from UK Police Cybercrime Units are given the aliases of CyberRM,
CyberLM, CyberTL, CyberBR, CyberBL, CyberTR and CyberCU.
Incidents took place between 2014 and 2018.
Phase 1
Sampling strategy and data collection
A purposeful sampling approach was employed to collect data in
Phase 1. We conducted 10 semi-structured interviews with profes-
sionals from organizations that became victims of ransomware
attacks. Interviewees were IT/Security Managers and Executive
Managers with an average of 17 years of professional experience.
There was one respondent per organization. Since some organiza-
tions were attacked more than once, accounts of 15 ransomware
incidents were elicited from 10 organizations. Appendix 1 (please
refer to first 15 incidents) contains information about the character-
istics of attacks and organizations that were interviewed in Phase 1.
In order to enhance the reliability and richness of data, we
sought access to individuals who had direct experience of respond-
ing to crypto-ransomware incidents. As for crypto-ransomware
attacks, the key selection criteria was to include a range of conse-
quences for the victims, varying from low severity (e.g. minimum
disruption to business, minimum loss of information, swift recovery)
to high impact (e.g. business disruption that lasted for several
months, significant loss of critical information, slow recovery).
An interview guide was designed with the aim to learn about par-
ticipants’ perceptions of the attacks’ impact and the factors that aggra-
vated or moderated the consequences of these incidents. This exercise
guided the development of the Impact Assessment Instrument. Since
we planned to use these initial 15 cases in Phase 2 of data analyses, we
also ensured to collect profile information about organizations (e.g.
size, sector and industry), causes of crypto-ransomware attacks, infor-
mation about security postures and characteristics of attacks (e.g. at-
tack type, crypto-ransomware propagation class and attack vector).
Sample interview questions are provided in Appendix 2. Six interviews
were conducted face-to-face, three via Skype with overseas respond-
ents and one via e-mail correspondence.
The decision to stop data collection in qualitative research is
made when additional insights are not emerging with new observa-
tions. This point is typically achieved after a dozen or so observa-
tions [44]. We felt that after examining about 10 ransomware
incidents, the incremental learning stopped. But to ensure that the
point of ‘theoretical saturation’ is sufficiently reached, we collected
data on 15 cases in total.
Impact Assessment Instrument development (qualitative data
analysis)
An inductive content analysis method was used to analyse data and
develop the Impact Assessment Instrument. Within the interview
transcripts, the impact of crypto-ransomware incidents emerged as a
major topic. Interviewees eagerly described their experiences of
being attacked, particularly focusing on the consequences of crypto-
ransomware attacks. For example, respondents from GovSecJN,
EducInstFB, LawEnfM, GovSecA and HealthSerJU spoke in great
detail about the despair and distress they experienced. An IT/
Security Manager from GovSecJN, a large public sector organiza-
tion, explained how business continuity disruption affected them:
There was an impact on service delivery – we could not do what we
were supposed to do. It was significant for us. Besides, all our resour-
ces were directed towards the incident instead of doing our job.
An IT/Security Manager from LawEnfJU reported a similar
experience:
Ransomware encrypted all of our data files, which, in effect, took
the agency offline for about 10 days. This was extremely critical as
we could not do our job. We had the server up-and-running in 10




Generation I Early variants of crypto-ransomware were not able to spread on networks and had lim-
ited propagation capabilities even within an infected machine (prior 2013).
AIDS Information
GPCoder
Generation II First emerged in 2013, this type can propagate by taking advantage of network paths.
Generation II crypto-ransomware can encrypt devices that are physically and logically
(e.g. ‘write’ access to server shares) connected to the infected machine. A common at-




Generation III.a (Trojans) First emerged in 2016, this type uses various tools (e.g. password-stealer Mimikatz) and
takes advantage of network weaknesses to propagate on infected networks. These var-
iants can infect entire networks, completely crippling an organization’s ability to func-




Generation III.b (Worms) First emerged in 2017, Generation III.b crypto-ransomware, also commonly referred as
‘crypto-worms’, takes advantage of software vulnerabilities. Similar to variants like
Samas and BitPaymer, crypto-worms can infect entire networks.
WannaCry
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days and then it took another 10 days to manually re-enter all
data. So, the attack critically affected the operations of the depart-
ment for about 20 days . . . . The overall impact of this attack was
severe, definitely.
An Executive Manager from EducInstFB, a large public organiza-
tion, shared with us that a Generation III.a crypto-ransomware
encrypted hundreds of machines (desktops, laptops and servers).
As a result, several critical business functions were disabled and
important data were inaccessible. The victim disclosed that various
security holes – including ineffective backups, poor patching
regimes, the lack of network visibility and feeble access control
management practices – led to infection and subsequent dramatic
consequences.
GovSecA, a large public organization, suffered an unprecedented
attack by Generation III.a crypto-ransomware, where close on 100
servers got encrypted, affecting the operations of the organization
for months. Most importantly, the victim lost a lot of critical data
because they only had partial backups. At the time of the interview,
GovSecA was already in post-attack recovery for 8 months. The
interviewee shared that the recovery was still not completed at this
point. An IT/Security Manager from GovSecA described their ex-
perience as follows:
We all came back to work on Tuesday morning after a bank holi-
day weekend and the sun was streaming in through the windows.
The cleaners have been in, the office looked great. Everyone felt
refreshed after the long weekend. And it took a while for us to
realise what happened; that all computing had been turned to
stone [encrypted]. Virtually nothing was left untouched. If half of
the building had fallen off, you would understand that something
has happened. But everything looked great. But it was not – the or-
ganisation could not operate.
An Executive Police Officer from LawEnfM, a public SME,
described how the organization suffered two ransomware attacks
within 2 weeks, affecting critical data:
We are a full-service law enforcement agency and we have a wide
variety of data, some of which is very sensitive. For example, data
relevant to criminal incidents like manslaughter cases, child porn-
ography, child sex cases. Several months worth of this data was
encrypted, which was pretty significant to us . . . . While we were
recovering after the first attack, we were very unfortunate to get
infected by ransomware again.
Comments such as in these few selected excerpts featured regularly in
the interviews. We observed that when victims described the impact
of ransomware attacks, they focused on factors such as business con-
tinuity disruption, recovery time, the number of devices affected, how
critical encrypted information was to business and information loss.
On the contrary, interviewees from LawEnfJ and GovSecJ talked
about factors that effectively saved the organization from far worse
outcomes and emphasized that organizations must be prepared for
these attacks or suffer severe consequences. For example, an IT/
Security Manager from LawEnfJ, a public SME, shared the following:
We practice good basic security principles. We have backups in
multiple locations . . . . It comes down to basics like staying up to
date with industry. Just recently we went through this massive
patching for Intel processors and other processes that could be
leveraged into a whole host of attacks . . . . We were well-prepared
for the attack . . . . We restored everything over a weekend. We
were infected on Friday and back up-and-running on Monday.
Similarly, an IT/Security Manager from GovSecJ, a large public or-
ganization, explained how they were able to recover with little
inconvenience:
An Incident Management Plan is crucial during cyber-attacks.
Instead of running around with our hands up in the area, scream-
ing for help, our response was logical and structured . . . . We lost
some data due to incremental backups but nothing significant that
would have stopped an organisation from functioning . . . . The in-
fection took place at approximately 9 in the morning. By the end
of the day, data was restored, and everything was back to normal.
As a result of our data analysis in Phase 1, five categories of negative
outcomes emerged from the data, namely ‘business continuity dis-
ruption timeline’, ‘recovery time’, ‘affected devices’, ‘encrypted in-
formation critical to business’ and ‘information loss’. Under each of
these categories, the data enabled us to build impact descriptors
ranging across three degrees of severity (low, medium and high). In
Table 3, we present the severity descriptors for the five impact cate-
gories and corresponding attacks.
Given the broad range of organization types and sectors in our
sample, we anticipated that it would be difficult to arrive at a con-
sensus on what constitutes ‘Low’, ‘Medium’ and ‘High’ levels of se-
verity. For example, an outcome that might be regarded as being of
‘Low’ severity by one respondent could possibly be regarded as
‘High’ by another, depending on the nature of their business and
level of dependency on critical IT systems. However, there was a re-
markable degree of consistency among the respondents. There is a
general acceptance that any ransomware attack, however minor, is
likely to result in an interruption of at least a few days rather than
hours. Thus, recovery times and business continuity disruption of a
number of days (up to a week) were rated as being on the ‘Low’ end
of the spectrum because, although any disruption is traumatic, in
relative terms that is the least amount of time that is expected to be
lost. As one interviewee put it,
Considering the impact and seriousness of the ransomware, it is
going to sound strange, but I think that to only lose twelve hours
worth of data is an acceptable outcome. If we had not backed up,
we would have lost 47,000 files, clearly that would have been a far
more significant issue. (IT/Security Manager, GovSecJN)
The Impact Assessment Instrument presented in Table 3 is derived
from empirical data and reflects the actual consequences of crypto-
ransomware attacks as described by the victims. All five of the items
shown in the table are components of the overall severity of a ran-
somware attack. Because the five items are measured on a three-
point ordinal scale, as opposed to a multiple-point continuous scale,
we used the ordinal alpha coefficient [45] to test for internal reliabil-
ity. The value for ordinal a¼0.96 which indicates a high degree of
agreement between the five items.
To compute a composite score for overall severity, we considered
using the average or median of the five items but decided to use the
maximum. The logic behind this reasoning is that if any of the items
is evaluated as ‘High’, it means that the attack represented a serious
shock to the organization with major consequences. Therefore, a
‘High’ severity value for any single item trumps all the others, even if
they all have lesser values. This also gets around the aforementioned
problem whereby the assessment instrument might misevaluate a
particular item as ‘Low’ when in fact, because of the organization’s
circumstances, it should be ‘High’; in such cases, the likelihood is
that at least one other item would have a ‘High’ rating and hence the
overall severity would correctly be evaluated as ‘High’.
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Next, using the Impact Assessment Instrument shown in Table 3,
we analysed all of the initial 15 cases (interview transcripts) to deter-
mine the extent of the attack impact. We assigned the degree of se-
verity for all five categories for each impact item. An exemplar of
this assessment exercise is provided in Appendix 3.
We were conscious of the limitation that the initial version of the
Impact Assessment Instrument was based on data collected from 10
public organizations, with no private businesses. To remedy this, as
we collected data on a further 45 cases, including both public and
private organizations, we asked interviewees to assess the severity of
ransomware attacks using our scale (i.e. low, medium, high) and
comment on the reasons for their answer. The purpose of this exer-
cise was to validate our instrument and confirm that the categories
that emerged initially were relevant across the whole sample. We
also validated the instrument by consulting with experienced police
officers. We found that the instrument gave a reliable measure of the
severity of an incident as perceived by the victim.
Phase 2
Sampling strategy and data collection
In order to test our hypotheses, we required to collect more data on
crypto-ransomware incidents. It has been widely acknowledged that
collecting data on cyberattacks is extremely difficult. In Phase 1, it
took us over 6 months to find organizations that were willing to
share sensitive matters relevant to the attacks. Therefore, we made a
decision to approach the data collection matter differently in Phase
2. Instead, we sought out police officers from UK Cybercrime Units
who had extensive experience in dealing with crypto-ransomware
attacks. Mainly, such experience included helping organizations to
effectively respond to the attacks, understanding what caused them,
providing emotional support to victims if necessary and offering
post-attack advice. Our expectation was that each police officer
would be able to provide relevant information on several ransom-
ware incidents at the time, which would make the process of data
collection more manageable.
We succeeded to connect with 10 police officers (four Detective
Sergeants and six Detective Constables) and 1 Civilian Cybercrime
Investigator, who provided information on 22 usable ransomware
incidents via semi-structured interviews and one focus group. Two
police officers were interviewed twice as they were able to add new
information. The average professional experience of the study
respondents was 19 years. We also managed to collect data on 22
more cases with a Detective Inspector, who, unfortunately, was
not able to meet with us face-to-face but agreed to provide data via
a structured questionnaire (sent over e-mail). Additionally, we
interviewed an IT/Security Manager with over 20 years of profes-
sional experience, which added one final case to our database of
ransomware incidents. Relevant information is available in
Appendix 1 (Cases 16–60). Due to the aforementioned access
constraints, a snowballing technique was used to collect data for
Phase 2.
The questionnaire and second phase interview guide (see
Appendix 4) were based on the Impact Assessment Instrument and
hypotheses. We asked questions that would help us to assess the im-
pact of an attack. We also collected profile information on organiza-
tions (e.g. size, sector and industry) and characteristics of attacks
(e.g. attack type, crypto-ransomware propagation class and attack
target). Additionally, we included questions that would help us clas-
sify the security posture of each organization. For this purpose, we
used the taxonomy of crypto-ransomware countermeasures devel-
oped in our previous work [8]. The headings from this taxonomy
served as a guide for questions. Therefore, in order to assess a secur-
ity posture of organization victims, we asked interviewees about se-
curity education, policies and practices, technical measures and
network security, the incident response strategy and the attitudes of
management towards cybersecurity (see Appendix 5).
Overall, 45 additional cases of ransomware attacks were exam-
ined in Phase 2, bringing the total to 60 cases. For five of the 60
cases, there was insufficient data to be able to determine the overall
impact severity, so those cases were discarded as being unusable,
leaving us with 55 usable cases. Although a snowballing technique
was used to collect data in Phase 2, our overall sample included
organizations of different sizes and from different sectors. Attacks
were recorded against both humans and machines by different
crypto-ransomware propagation classes. Different levels of security
posture were noted among participants, ranging from weak to
strong. Finally, the sample contained opportunistic attacks as well
as targeted ones.
For a few of the cases, we did not have values for all of the five
items in the Impact Assessment; in those cases, we evaluated the
overall impact based on the maximum of the items for which we
had values, supported by an inspection of qualitative data from
those cases. We found that this method of computing the composite
score for overall severity gave the most accurate results, as validated
using participants’ personal assessment of the attack impact and our
own judgement based on what we gleaned from interviews. Results
of the assessment exercise are available in Table 4.
Table 3. Impact Assessment Instrument and corresponding victims




Up to 1 week Up to 2 weeks More than 2 weeks
Recovery time Up to 1 week Up to 1 month Several months or more, if at all
Affected devices One or more user devices, possibly
including shares on one
or more servers
Several devices and more than
one server; or where a central server
is encrypted affecting not just
individual users but the functioning
of a whole department
All or majority of devices, completely





Data critical to some business
functions of low to medium priority
Data critical to majority of business functions,
or some high priority function(s)
Information loss No loss, or some loss acceptable
with incremental backups
Loss affecting some critical
business functions
Loss affecting all or majority of critical
business functions
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Quantitative data analysis
Overall, our sample included 50 organizations of different sizes, sec-
tors (i.e. public or private) and industries (55 usable cases of crypto-
ransomware attacks). Totally, 35 (70%) of the organizations were
SMEs, while 15 (30%) were large organizations. We used the
European Commission guidance to define the organization’s size
[46]. The industries were broad and varied, including IT, govern-
ment, law enforcement, education, healthcare, financial services,
construction, retail, logistics, utility providers and several other cate-
gories. Of the 50 organizations, 19 (38%) were in the public sector
and 31 (62%) were in the private sector. Five (10%) were located in
the North America and 45 (90%) in the UK (see Appendix 7).
Security postures were determined for 34 of the 50 organizations
(see Table 5). Twenty organizations (59%) had a weak security pos-
ture, 13 (38%) had a medium-security posture and only one had a
strong posture. We used the criteria outlined in Appendices 5 and 6
to assess the security postures of organizations.
Except where otherwise stated, the hypotheses were assessed
using two-sided Fisher’s Exact tests. The size of our sample provides
acceptable power to detect moderate-to-large relationships between
categorical variables using this technique. Where data was missing,
cases were excluded; the number of relevant cases (n) is stated in the
results of each test.
We found that the degree of severity of a ransomware attack did
not vary by organizational size, P ¼ 0.542. Indeed, the majority of
attacks in both SMEs and large organizations were of high severity
(57% and 53%, respectively).
The severity did, however, vary according to organizational sec-
tor. Private organizations were considerably more likely than public
organizations to experience serious negative consequences as a result
of ransomware attacks, P ¼ 0.044. Of the private organizations,
68% were hit by attacks of the highest severity, whereas a much
lower percentage (37%) of public organizations were as badly
affected. This finding supports Hypothesis 1b.
Most tellingly, impacts also varied with organizational security
posture, such that those organizations with weak security postures
were far more likely to experience a severe impact than were those
with medium or strong postures, n¼34, P < 0.001. Of the organi-
zations that had a weak posture, 80% had been hit by ransomware
attacks of high severity. Thus, Hypothesis 1c is also supported.
Post hoc, we found that security posture did not differ according
to organization size, with the majority of organizations – 57% of
SMEs and 64% of large organizations – having a weak security pos-
ture. However, when looking at the relationship between organiza-
tion sector and security posture, a significant difference (P ¼ 0.035)
was observed. Public organizations had considerably stronger secur-
ity postures than those in the private sector. This may partly explain
why the impact of attacks on public sector organizations was not as
severe.
As can be seen in Appendix 1, the 50 organizations spanned 23
different industries (i.e. financial services, healthcare, retail, etc.) so
it was not meaningful to conduct correlation analysis on this vari-
able as the numbers were spread too thin. However, one observation
that stands out is that of the seven respondents from the IT industry,
six of them (86%) experienced attacks of high severity. This is above
average and somewhat surprising, although with such a small sub-
sample it is not possible to draw reliable inferences.
Looking then at the crypto-ransomware propagation classes, 32
(58%) were of type Generation II, while 23 (42%) were of type
Generation III (Generation III.a and Generation III.b classes were
merged in data analysis due to similar propagation characteristics).
Totally, 38 attacks (72%) were opportunistic and 15 (28%) were
targeted. Twenty-five attacks (47%) were targeted at humans and
28 (53%) aimed at machines (see Table 6).
The degree of severity did not vary with the crypto-ransomware
propagation class (i.e. Generation II vs. Generation III) n¼55, P ¼
0.334, nor with the attack target (i.e. human vs. machine), n¼53, P
¼ 0.813.
The type of the attack (opportunistic vs. targeted) was also con-
sidered. Targeted attacks were more likely than opportunistic
ones to lead to severe consequences, n¼53, P ¼ 0.063. 80% of tar-
geted attacks gave rise to impacts of high severity, whereas a consid-
erably lower proportion of opportunistic attacks (45%) had high
negative consequences. This difference is statistically significant
(Mann–Whitney U¼177, P ¼ 0.02) so we are inclined to accept
Hypothesis 2b.
Post hoc, companies with a weak posture were much more likely
to be targeted via machine vulnerabilities as a point of entry, where-
as companies with medium or strong security postures were more
likely to be attacked via social engineering tricks (n¼34, P ¼
Table 4. Impact Assessment Instrument and observed frequencies among respondents (n¼ 55)




Up to 1 week (65%) Up to 2 weeks (14%) More than 2 weeks (21%)
Recovery time (n¼ 51) Up to 1 week (59%) Up to 1 month (22%) Several months or more, if at all
(19%)
Affected devices (n¼ 53) One or more user devices, possibly
including shares on one or more
servers (53%)
Several devices and more than one
server; or where a central server is
encrypted affecting not just indi-
vidual users but the functioning of
a whole department (19%)
All or majority of devices, complete-
ly or almost completely crippling
IT systems (28%)
Encrypted information critical to
business (n¼ 51)
Some data compromised, but noth-
ing critical (29%)
Data critical to some business func-
tions of low to medium priority
(24%)
Data critical to majority of business
functions, or some high priority
function(s) (47%)
Information loss (n¼ 47) No loss or some loss acceptable with
incremental backups (57%)
Loss affecting some critical business
functions (32%)
Loss affecting all or majority of crit-
ical business functions (11%)
Overall impact severity (compos-
ite score) (n¼ 55)
Low (27%) Medium (20%) High (53%)
Note: Overall n¼ 55 but item response rates ranged from 85% (47) to 96% (53).
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0.019). We also observed that 91% of targeted attacks were against
organizations that had weak security posture. Table 7 demonstrates
results of hypotheses tests.
Interpretation and discussion
Organization size does not matter, ransomware is
indiscriminate
Within the observed sample, organization size, by itself, did not af-
fect the severity of attacks. As outlined in ‘Organisation characteris-
tics: size and sector’ section, prior findings and opinions on the
relationship between organization size and the incidence of ransom-
ware attacks are rather inconsistent, with some saying that ransom-
ware is mainly a problem for large enterprises and others saying that
SMEs make up the bulk of the victims. Of the organizations that we
observed, SMEs and large organizations were similarly impacted by
ransomware attacks and in most cases the impact felt was of high se-
verity. This result is consistent with interpretations expressed by po-
lice officers from UK Cybercrime Units:
Ransomware is indiscriminate. It does not choose its victims. It
chooses computers and those computers can be owned by any-
body. (Detective Sergeant, CyberBL)
Ransomware does not target organisations of a particular size. All
organisations, small, medium and large, are equally affected.
(Detective Sergeant, CyberRM)
We observed several large organizations that experienced severe
consequences of crypto-ransomware attacks (e.g. EducInstFB,
GovSecA, HealthSerJU, SportClubJ, etc.) as well as SMEs (e.g.
LawEnfJU, LawEnfF, ITOrgA, ConstrSupA, etc.). Therefore, re-
gardless of how large or small an organization is, there is no room
for complacency. SMEs often baulk at spending their limited funds
on IT security measures, weighing things up on the basis of the fi-
nancial cost of countermeasures vs. the expected probability and
expected impact of an attack [30]. While we cannot offer any
insights into the probability of an attack, we can speak about im-
pact. Our findings show that if an organization has weak defence
mechanisms, then regardless of whether it is an indigenous start-up
or a large multi-national corporation, it is likely to experience very
severe consequences in the event of a ransomware attack, such as
having critical systems knocked out, heavy data losses and major
disruptions of several weeks or more.
Private sector organizations are more likely to
experience severe effects
Private sector organizations were more likely to report severe
impacts than were those in the public sector in the sample observed
in this study. This finding can be explained by the very nature of
public organizations as compared to private businesses. Public sector
organizations are generally state-owned with an obligation to pro-
vide some universal service such as healthcare, education, policing,
or civic administration. The private sector, on the contrary, is main-
ly composed of organizations whose ultimate purpose is not to serve
the public but to generate profit. Cyberattacks on profit-driven
organizations normally lead to substantial financial losses, reputa-
tional damage and loss of customers; the series of security breaches
on TalkTalk is one such example [47]. If public organizations such
as councils, state agencies and police departments experience a
cyberattack, they may lose public confidence, but as sole suppliers
they are not going to lose customers or revenue as they are publicly
funded. As an IT/Security Manager from GovSecJN (a public organ-
ization fully funded by the UK government) explained:
Yes, there was a financial impact because resources were directed
towards dealing with the cyber-attack. But it is difficult for us to
quantify the financial impact . . . . The impact is different for us. It
is the impact on service delivery to public. How we care for
Table 6. Cross-tabulations for Hypotheses 2a, 2 b and 2c
Attack severity, n (%)
Low Medium High
H2a: Crypto-ransomware type (n¼ 55)
Generation II 10 (31) 8 (25) 14 (44)
Generation III 5 (22) 3 (13) 15 (65)
H2b: Attack target (n¼ 53)
Human 5 (20) 6 (24) 14 (56)
Machine 8 (29) 5 (18) 15 (54)
H2c: Attack type (n¼ 53)*
Opportunistic 12 (32) 9 (24) 17 (45)
Targeted 1 (7) 2 (13) 12 (80)
*P < 0.1.
Table 5. Cross-tabulations for Hypotheses 1a, 1 b and 1c
Attack severity, n (%)
Low Medium High
H1a: Organization size (n¼ 50)
SME 7 (20) 8 (23) 20 (57)
Large 5 (33) 2 (13) 8 (53)
H1b: Sector (n¼ 50)*
Public 5 (26) 7 (37) 7 (37)
Private 7 (23) 3 (10) 21 (68)
H1c: Security posture (n¼ 34)***
Weak 0 (0) 4 (20) 16 (80)
Medium 4 (31) 6 (46) 3 (23)
Strong 1 (100) 0 (0) 0 (0)
*P < 0.05; ***P < 0.001.
Table 7. Results of hypothesis tests
Hypothesis Result
Hypothesis 1a: An organization’s size influences the
degree of severity of a ransomware attack
Rejected
Hypothesis 1b: An organization’s sector influences
the degree of severity of a ransomware attack
Accepted
Hypothesis 1c: An organization’s security posture
influences the degree of severity of a ransomware
attack
Accepted
Hypothesis 2a: The crypto-ransomware propaga-
tion class influences the impact severity of a ran-
somware attack
Rejected
Hypothesis 2b: The attack type, i.e. opportunistic
or targeted, influences the degree of severity of a
ransomware attack
Accepted
Hypothesis 2c: The attack target, i.e. human or ma-
chine, influences the degree of severity of a ran-
somware attack
Rejected
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children. How we care for adults. Even road potholes – people
could not report potholes because our systems were down.
Information from interviews with police officers working in the UK
Cybercrime Units confirmed our impression that private sector
organizations suffer more severe consequences; e.g. a specialist de-
tective within the CyberTL unit told us based on his extensive ex-
perience that:
Cybercriminals know that the private sector depends on customer
service. They know that these organisations will pay. Especially,
we find that a lot of IT companies have been hit. I do not think
this is because IT companies are more prone to targeting. It is just
because when they are hit by ransomware, it is so much more dev-
astating for them due to their dependency on customers.
This observation is in line with our finding that 86% of respondents
from the IT industry experienced attacks of high severity. However,
it should be noted that our sample is based on attack victims only
and is not representative of the number of potential organizations in
each industry. Additionally, public or semi-public institutions may
experience an equivalent attack as being less critical simply because
they are not in competition with other providers.
Against the threat of ransomware, a vigilant security
posture is vital
Our hypothesis that there is a relationship between organizational
security posture and attack severity was supported. Most specifical-
ly, a weak security posture leads to a preponderance of very severe
attacks. This suggests that the attacks were detected late, handled
badly, or inadequately isolated. Although this observation is rele-
vant to any type of cybercrime, successful ransomware attacks entail
unique and rather devastating consequences such as disabled sys-
tems, encrypted data and, subsequently, halted business operations.
A security weakness that could be easily fixed might cause substan-
tial damage to the victim and even bankruptcy. For example,
LogOrgD was infected via a server vulnerability that was widely
documented by academics, security vendors and government bodies.
Subsequently, the organization lost access to all critical data, including
backups. The victim was rapidly losing its customer base and the busi-
ness was close to bankruptcy. The business owner was particularly
distressed and at some point, even had suicidal thoughts – a lifetime
of hard work was about to turn into ashes. Ultimately, the company
managed to survive but the recovery was timely, costly and extremely
challenging. Therefore, IT/Security professionals must be extremely
vigilant when it comes to protecting their organizations against ran-
somware. There is no simple technological ‘silver bullet’ that will
wipe out the crypto-ransomware threat. Rather, a multi-layered ap-
proach is needed which consists of socio-technical measures, zealous
front-line managers and active support from senior management [8].
As an IT/Security Manager from LawEnfJ puts it:
You have to have the fundamentals in place. If you are talking about
backups after the event, you are dead in the water. You must have
your system set up in a way that actively thwarts these attacks. If
you are playing catch-up, then I am sorry, but the game is over at
that point. You must stay up-to-date. If you are not staying current
in the industry, you are going to get in trouble really quick.
Several respondents commented that if vulnerabilities are not closed
down following ransomware attacks, organizations will get attacked
again. For example, GovSecJ was attacked 4 times within 6 months.
Although the IT/Security Manager wrote a report recommending
organizational changes, senior management did not act upon it.
Subsequently, three more attacks followed.
Though LawEnfM made a decision to implement all appropriate
changes following the first ransomware attack, ransomware struck
second time during the recovery process, taking advantage of the
same vulnerabilities. Since the organization suffered considerably as
a result of two consequent attacks, the external IT provider made a
decision to pay the ransom as they felt responsible. Following this
devastating experience (two attacks within 2 weeks), LawEnfM
made several important changes in its approach to cybersecurity.
HealthSerJU had to experience two very severe attacks before senior
management realized the importance of security controls and
measures:
I think both attacks fundamentally came down to the fact that
there was an under-appreciation of the importance of IT and,
therefore, the focus on ensuring that those systems were properly
protected was not there . . . . If we wanted to take a positive from
the attacks, it would be that finally executive management gave IT
a profile that it has never had before. (IT/Security Manager,
HealthSerJU)
Within our sample, public organizations had considerably stronger
security postures than those in the private sector. Totally, 78% of
the private organizations that we looked at had weak security pos-
tures, as opposed to 38% in the public sector. This may be because
public institutions have a stronger regulatory mandate to have IT se-
curity policies in place. In the UK, the Cyber Essentials scheme was
introduced in 2014 and is required for all central government con-
tracts [48]. In contrast, in the private sector, the majority of organi-
zations do not mandate their suppliers to have cybersecurity
standards in operation [4].
Of course, the promotion of security standards is one matter,
adoption is another and actual compliance yet another again. In the
past 12 months, 17 452 Cyber Essentials certificates were
issued by the UK government [49] which, going by the estimated 2.6
million businesses in the country [50] represents just 0.7% of the
population. Within higher education institutions – from which div-
ision 29% of our public sector sample was drawn – there has
been considerable resistance to the uptake of the Cyber Essentials
standard [51]. The ISO27001 standard has been more widely
adopted in the UK, but less so in public administration and educa-
tional organizations than elsewhere [52]. The annual UK Cyber
Breaches Surveys of recent years reveal that a growing number of
businesses are adopting Cyber Essentials, ISO27001, or other simi-
lar policies, but it still remains at about half who have no such meas-
ures in place [4].
Ransomware attacks, even of the less sophisticated
type, can wreak havoc
There was no pronounced effect of the crypto-ransomware propaga-
tion class upon attack impact in the sample examined in this study.
This is an interesting finding because Generation III crypto-
ransomware has the ability to propagate across large networks and
completely paralyse organizational operations. As a Detective
Sergeant from CyberTR pointed out:
When I first started, the virus was very specific to the machine.
The machine that clicked on the email was the machine that got
the virus and the ransomware and that was it. More recent var-
iants of ransomware have the ability to spread. There is definitely
a distinction between ransomware that will hit a computer and en-
crypt any physically connected devices such as USBs, storage
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devices, and it is a lot more simple, and the likes of WannaCry
that will travel across networks and spread to all computers. We
have seen this evolution, where suspects are using vulnerabilities
to spread across networks. This type of ransomware is more preva-
lent than it ever was because it gives hackers an advantage.
Rationally, Generation III should bring more devastation. However,
our data show otherwise. For example, SecOrgM was infected with
the less sophisticated Generation II crypto-ransomware. The victim
declared bankruptcy shortly after the attack because the organiza-
tion did not have backups, could not operate without hijacked data
and at the same time was not able to meet ransom demands.
Similarly, GovSecJN was hit with the Generation II ransomware
class but it had a detrimental effect on the victim. Although
GovSecJN recovered relatively quickly, data critical to high priority
functions was encrypted, affecting essential functions of the organ-
ization. Such organizations provide vital services to the local com-
munity and many people depend on these services.
On the contrary, EducInstFB was attacked with Generation III
crypto-ransomware that infected hundreds of devices. EducInstFB
and its staff lost access to an enormous volume of data, which had
scientific value. Several critical systems were disabled that stopped
the victim from performing their normal daily tasks. The manage-
ment made a decision to pay the ransom. Although the recovery was
lengthy and challenging, EducInstFB eventually repaired its systems
and recovered the majority of data. Another victim of Generation III
crypto-ransomware – HealthSerJU – was attacked twice and on
both occasions over a thousand devices were infected. Although
these attacks had a significant negative effect on the delivery of serv-
ices, HealthSerJU had effective backups and, therefore, promptly
restored its systems. EducOrgA was also infected with Generation
III crypto-ransomware, affecting the whole network. However, due
to the nature of its business, EducOrgA continued its work as a pri-
mary school and teaching activities were not interrupted (while ad-
ministrative data were gradually restored).
Following these observations, we concluded that the crypto-
ransomware propagation class alone may not have a direct impact
on the consequences of these attacks. Rather, a combination of fac-
tors (e.g. the nature of business, availability of resources to recover
data or pay the ransom, the type of systems affected, level of pre-
paredness, etc.) are at play.
Beware the ‘weakest link’
Although Hypothesis 2c was rejected, indicating that the severity of
a ransomware attack is not influenced by the attack target (i.e.
human or machine), we observed that organizations with a weak
posture were much more likely to be targeted via machine vulner-
abilities as a point of entry, whereas those with medium or strong se-
curity postures were more likely to be attacked via social
engineering tricks. This finding could be explained by the fact that
many of our study participants trust that technical controls provide
an adequate defence against cyberthreats, which is also a commonly
accepted belief among industry professionals. Consequently, IT/
Security professionals focus on implementing measures like e-mail
hygiene, vulnerability and upgrade management and sophisticated
monitoring and detection systems, but seemed to neglect the ‘human
factor’ problem and do not have strong security education and train-
ing, the importance of which as a security countermeasure is well
established [6, 37, 38]. Therefore, these organizations are attacked
via ‘the weakest link’ – they may have an adequate defence from a
technical perspective, but weak employee security practices. As the
IT/Security Manager from GovSecJ put it:
Effective defence always starts with a user. You need to make sure
that along with teaching people how to use your applications, IT
systems, you incorporate in there a good amount of cyber security.
In our sample, 27 attacks were successful due to humans opening
malicious attachments or clicking on links. Several respondents
alluded to shortcomings regarding human error and made appropri-
ate changes. For example, LawEnfM replaced online security train-
ing with face-to-face tuition after an employee failed to notice rather
obvious signs of a malicious e-mail. A staff member from LawEnfJU
shut down their own machine after receiving a ransom note and
booted several other machines using their credentials. Although the
employee hoped to solve the problem, they instead infected more
machines and lost precious time to contain infection. Since then,
LawEnfJU implemented a new policy that obliges employees to re-
port any out-of-ordinary activity, no matter how insignificant it
seems. The organization regularly sends its employees ‘call and ver-
ify’ warnings to remind them of this new rule. However, even with
effective security education in place, humans are continually prone
to make mistakes and do things they know they probably shouldn’t.
For example, an employee from GovSecJN who had recently com-
pleted security training still proceeded to open an e-mail attachment,
even though he felt it was quite suspicious and potentially risky.
Don’t become an easy target, be careful what you
reveal about your organization
Targeted attacks were more likely than opportunistic ones to lead to
severe consequences in the observed sample. This result is expected
as targeted attacks require a lot of preparation, but the ‘prize’ is
much higher:
There is a recent trend of a particular variant of ransomware
called BitPaymer, which is seen as a big problem. It seems to me
to be very targeted because cybercriminals are making
extremely large demands on the businesses, which I have never seen
before – £30,000 –so they are clearly very targeted. Cybercriminals
know the targets they are going after. (Detective Sergeant, CyberTL)
Such attacks suggest that there is some kind of network reconnais-
sance behind, so cybercriminals know what company they are tar-
geting and how much to ask for. Cybercriminals will say, ‘Wait
there, your turnover is £400m so you can pay maybe £2m’. There
are victims out there that have paid up to £1,000,000 or even
more to get the decryption key. (Detective Constable, CyberBR)
Clearly, such extravagant amounts would have a more severe effect
on an organization than, e.g. the typical £300–500 ransom. In our
own sample, one small IT company (VirtOrgD) was asked to pay 75
bitcoins (approximate value £352 000 at the time of the attack), a
ransom amount the victim could not afford to pay. After intense
negotiations, hackers agreed to reduce the ransom amount to 65 bit-
coins, but it was still too high for VirtOrgD. The victim had no
choice but to recover from partial backups. In the first stages of re-
covery the management was not sure if the business was going to
survive this attack as the VirtOrgD was rapidly losing its customer
base. Through tremendous efforts of staff and with the help of exter-
nal specialists, VirtOrgD managed to restore its business, although,
inevitably, some substantial losses occurred. Similarly, another com-
pany (ITOrgJL) was asked to pay 100 bitcoins (approximate value
of £470 000 at the time of the attack). ITOrgJL was able to negoti-
ate the ransom down to 15 bitcoins and effectively recovered with a
decryption key provided by hackers.
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Both organizations VirtOrgD and ITOrgJL had weak security
postures, which allowed hackers not only to penetrate their net-
works but also stay undetected for several days searching for loop-
holes to spread within the network and encrypt multiple devices,
including servers that contained crucial data and systems. This con-
firms our observation that the majority of targeted attacks were exe-
cuted against organizations that had weak security posture. The
lethality of targeted attacks lies within hackers’ ability to execute
network reconnaissance in order to find the most critical company’s
assets (e.g. backup server, customer data, etc.) and security weak-
nesses that will allow to hijack these assets. It is up to organizations
to take appropriate measures to avoid such dramatic consequences.
Conclusions
Our research findings demonstrate that several factors, including
‘organization sector’, ‘security posture’ and ‘attack type’, influence
the degree of severity of ransomware attacks. More specifically,
within our sample, private organizations were more likely to experi-
ence severe consequences compared to public ones. Interestingly,
public organizations investigated in this study had considerably
stronger security postures than those in the private sector. Private
organizations typically operate to generate profit and any interrup-
tions to services can cause grave damage to them. Public organiza-
tions, on the contrary, are funded by the government to serve the
public. Subsequently, financial implications are not always relevant
to them. We assert that private organizations need to recognize this
vulnerability and ‘up their game’ in the security realm.
Furthermore, organizations that had weak security postures suf-
fered harsher outcomes of ransomware attacks as opposed to com-
panies with stronger postures. This finding indicates that the need to
strengthen security postures in a bid to defend organizational assets
against ransomware attacks is greater than ever. Hackers are relent-
lessly taking advantage of well-documented issues (e.g. RDP brute-
force, poor security training, insufficient vulnerability management).
It is important to note that organizations must focus on technical
and non-technical controls as both are vital; one without the other is
futile. As our results demonstrate, targeted attacks are mainly prey-
ing on technical shortcomings but even if all technical loopholes are
closed down, hackers can still hit a potential victim by exploiting
human weaknesses.
Moreover, targeted attacks brought more devastation to affected
organizations in our sample compared to those who were hit oppor-
tunistically. Offenders normally invest more effort into targeted
attacks and hence, expect higher yields. For example, a thorough in-
vestigation of the target may take place, so the hackers can under-
stand how profitable the business is, what information is critical to its
continuity and how much the victim can potentially afford to pay.
Whether or not the victim pays, they are still going to suffer substan-
tially. In a scenario where they pay, the ransom is going to be very
high and the organization is going to experience considerable finan-
cial losses. In a situation where the victim does not pay, they are going
to suffer not only financially (in many cases, recovery is more expen-
sive than the ransom payment), but also experience significant disrup-
tions to business operations. Therefore, it is worth making
cybersecurity investments rather than face consequences of the tar-
geted ransomware attacks. As our findings suggest, organizations
with stronger security postures are less vulnerable to targeted attacks.
Our results also indicate that ‘organization size’, ‘crypto-ransom-
ware propagation class’ and ‘attack target’ have no significant im-
pact on the severity level of ransomware attacks. Within our sample,
organizations of all sizes were afflicted by ransomware attacks, with
consequences ranging from less severe (e.g. relatively short business
continuity disruption timeline and insignificant information loss) to
highly severe, where organizations faced a challenging recovery and,
in many cases, came very close to business bankruptcy. In fact, one
organization in our sample (SecOrgM) did not survive the ransom-
ware attack. This finding underlines the indiscriminate nature of
ransomware and serves as caution against common but dangerous
attitudes such as ‘hackers could not possibly gain anything from
attacking us – we are too small’, ‘we do not hold any state secrets or
any other sensitive information that would be of interest to hackers’,
‘hackers are normally after banks as this is where the money is’, etc.
Since 2013, ransomware has evolved considerably and become
much more technically advanced and dangerous. Generation III is
substantially more of a menace than Generation II because of its
greater degree of contagiousness and ability to self-propagate across
infected networks. However, we found that the propagation class of
crypto-ransomware by itself had no effect on the severity of crypto-
ransomware attacks in the observed sample. Regarding the attack
target (i.e. machine vs. human), crypto-ransomware equally impacts
victims despite the network access method.
As ransomware attacks continue to hurt businesses around the
globe, our results convey several important messages. First, we urge
organizations of all sizes, small, medium and large, to strengthen
their security posture. Secondly, we specifically stress that the vul-
nerabilities of private companies to ransomware attacks must be
realized and addressed. Offenders are aware of their dependency on
data and systems and take advantage of it. Thirdly, we conclude
that the strength of ransomware is not in its technical capabilities
and rapid evolution; rather, it lies within relentlessness of hackers
who are persistently searching for a range of weaknesses within
organizations. Security holes are widely exploited by perpetrators,
but hackers also understand the sentimental value organizations
may have to their owners who possibly spent a lifetime building
their business (e.g. LogOrgD case). Criminals exploit the sense of re-
sponsibility that IT and Cyber Security professionals may experience
if a company is significantly suffering from an attack (e.g.
LawEnfM), or the responsibility management may feel because their
staff is facing very challenging working conditions during attacks
and potential harsh consequences post-attacks (e.g. EducInstFB). All
of these factors inevitably make ransomware attacks ever so painful,
while hackers are persistently doing their homework on potential
victims; and this is why targeted attacks hit even harder.
This work makes a number of valuable contributions to the exist-
ing body of academic literature on ransomware. It increases know-
ledge about factors that can make crypto-ransomware attacks
absolutely unbearable for affected organizations. We urge readers to
learn from the experiences of victims presented in this work and take
appropriate preventative actions to avoid, transfer or mitigate the
risks of a crypto-ransomware attack. The article also introduces (see
‘Crypto-ransomware propagation class’ section) a simple but useful
set of terms that can be used by various parties (e.g. academics, in-
dustry professionals, government bodies, etc.) to refer to different
classes of this threat according to the degree of infectiousness, i.e.
‘Generation I’, ‘Generation II’, etc. Finally, we developed an Impact
Assessment Instrument, which can be applied in further academic
works that specifically focus on the crypto-ransomware impact.
This study has a number of limitations. As always, studying cyber-
crime is a challenge because researchers are faced with incomplete
data, skewed surveys and questionable assumptions. The majority of
our respondents were based in one country (the UK). Our sample size
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of 55, though respectable, is still quite small. Therefore, statistically
speaking, the findings cannot be generalized outside the given sample
and are only applicable within the observed 55 ransomware attacks.
A logical follow-on would be to test our conclusions against a larger,
more international data set – but a practical problem is how to readily
obtain such data. Typically, ransomware victims do not disclose the
full reality of their experiences in official complaints or incident
reports [3]. Insurance companies such as Advisen have databases of
incidents, but these only include organizations that were insured
against cyberattacks and made claims. Unfortunately, these sorts of
sampling and access issues are typical in cybersecurity research [25]
and, as we earlier saw in Table 1, it greatly complicates comparability
between studies. We executed our study as rigorously as we could,
combining quantitative and qualitative data, and although we believe
it is robust and broadly generalizable, that is a point of conjecture.
Furthermore, in terms of limitations, in Phase 1, we interviewed
one participant per organization. This is a very common limitation
in qualitative data collection, where the principal interviewee typic-
ally plays the role of a ‘gatekeeper’, especially when the subject mat-
ter pertains to highly sensitive and confidential matters within the
organization. We used a snowballing sampling strategy in Phase 2 of
data collection which, though not ideal, was the only pragmatic way
we could collect data on ransomware attacks.
As regard future research, in the next step we are planning to learn
what makes ransomware so effective in a wider cybercrime eco-system.
While in this study we assessed factors that make these attacks impact-
ful, ransomware is a very complex threat and organized criminals em-
ploy various tactics to make these attacks successful. Therefore, we
intend to learn about numerous vulnerabilities that cybercriminals prey
on (whether technical, social or psychological), specifically focusing on
victims’ decision-making processes regarding ransom payments. The
ultimate purpose of this study will be to identify a series of measures
that could potentially reduce ransom payments.
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Appendix 1: Profile of participant organizations and corresponding attacks characteristics
Attack ID Crypto-ransomware propagation class; attack target; attack type Organization alias Industry; size; sector
1 Generation II; human; opportunistic LawEnfJ Law enforcement; SME; public
2 Generation II; human; opportunistic GovSecJN Government; large; public
3 Generation II; machine; opportunistic GovSecJ Government; large; public
4 Generation II; human; opportunistic
5 Generation II; machine; opportunistic
6 Generation II; machine; opportunistic
7 Generation II; machine; opportunistic EducInstF Education; large; public
8 Generation III.a; machine; targeted EducInstFB Education; large; public
9 Generation II; human; opportunistic LawEnfM Law enforcement; SME; public
10 Generation II; human; opportunistic
11 Generation III.a; machine; targeted GovSecA Government; large; public
12 Generation II; human; opportunistic LawEnfJU Law enforcement; SME; public
13 Generation III.b; machine; opportunistic HealthSerJU Health service; large; public
14 Generation III.a; human; targeted
15 Generation II; human; opportunistic LawEnfF Law enforcement; SME; public
16 Generation II; machine; opportunistic ITOrgA IT; SME; private
17 Generation III.a; machine; opportunistic ConstrSupA Construction; SME; private
18 Generation III.a; machine; targeted EducOrgA Education; SME; public
19 Generation II; human; opportunistic SecOrgM IT; SME; private
20 Generation III.a; machine; targeted ITOrgJL IT; SME; private
21 Generation II; human; opportunistic CloudProvJL IT; SME; private
22 Generation III.a; machine; targeted InfOrgJL Infrastructure; SME; private
23 Generation III.a; machine; opportunistic ConstrSupJ Construction; SME; private
24 Generation II; human; opportunistic RelOrgJ Religion; SME; private
25 Generation III.a; machine; targeted SportClubJ Entertainment; large; private
26 Generation III.a; machine; targeted UtilOrgD Utilities; large; private
27 Generation III.a; e-mail; targeted VirtOrgD IT; SME; private
28 Generation III.a; machine; opportunistic CleanOrgD Cleaning; SME; private
29 Generation II; human; opportunistic EducOrgD Education; SME; public
30 Generation II; human; opportunistic SerOrgD Waste; SME; private
31 Generation III.a; machine; opportunistic EducCompD Education; SME; public
32 Generation III.a; machine; opportunistic PrimOrgD Education; SME; public
33 Generation III.a; machine; opportunistic LogOrgD Logistics; SME; private
34 Generation III.a; machine; opportunistic ITCompD IT; SME; private
35 Generation III.a; machine; opportunistic LogWarJ Logistics; large; private
36 Generation III.a; machine; targeted TranspOrgJ Transport; large; private
37 Generation II; human; targeted CharOrgJ Charity; SME; public
38 Generation II; human; opportunistic EducInstJ Education; large; public
39 Generation II; human; opportunistic DigMedM Retailer; SME; private
40 Generation II; human; opportunistic ConstrSupAP Construction; SME; private
41 Generation II; human; opportunistic FinOrgAP Finance; SME; private
42 Generation II; unknown; unknown ConstrOrgAP Construction; SME; private
43 Generation II; unknown; unknown LetAgenAP Letting agency; SME; private
44 Generation III.a; machine; targeted EducOrgAP Education; large; public
45 Generation II; human; opportunistic ConstrArcAP Construction; SME; private
46 Generation II; human; opportunistic LegalOrgAP Legal; SME; private
47 Generation II; human; opportunistic BevOrgAP Beverages; SME; private
48 Generation II; human; opportunistic ChCarAP Childcare; SME; public
49 Generation III.a; machine; opportunistic EducPrimAP Education; large; public
50 Generation II; human; opportunistic RetOrgAP Retailer; large; private
51 Generation III.a; machine; opportunistic
52 Generation III.a; machine; targeted ITOrgAP IT; SME; private
53 Generation III.a; machine; opportunistic MarkOrgAP Marketing; SME; private
54 Generation III.a; machine; opportunistic ChemOrgAP Chemical; SME; private
55 Generation III.a; machine; opportunistic EducHscAP Education; large; public
56 Generation III.a; machine; opportunistic HospOrgAP Hospitality; large; private
57 Generation II; human; opportunistic WasteOrgAP Waste; SME; private
58 Generation III.a; machine; opportunistic FinCompAP Finance; large; private
59 Generation II; human; targeted LegAdvAP Legal; SME; private
60 Generation III.a; machine; opportunistic LegSolcAP Legal; SME; private
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Appendix 2: Sample interview questions (Phase 1)
Appendix 3: Impact assessment exercise exemplar
Appendix 4: Sample interview questions (Phase 2)
Questions
Can you please tell me about the attack?
How would you rate the attack in terms of the level of severity?
Was your business affected by the ransomware attack?
If yes, then to what extent?
What functions were affected?
Were your data affected by the ransomware attack?
If yes, then to what extent?
Did you manage to restore the data that were encrypted?
In your opinion, are there any other negative impacts the ransomware attack had on your organization?
In your opinion, was the ransomware attack effective?
If yes, why do you think ransomware was effective?
What factors contributed to the effectiveness of this attack?
Crypto attacks Category Item! corresponding impact level! corresponding digit
Attack 1 Business continuity disruption timeframe Up to 1 week! ‘Low’! 1
Encrypted information critical to business Not critical! ‘Low’! 1
Information loss Some loss acceptable with incremental backups! ‘Low’! 1
Affected devices One desktop and shares on a server! ‘Low’! 1
Recovery time Up to 2 weeks! ‘Low’! 1
Maximum value 1
Attack impact level Low
Attack 9 Business continuity disruption timeframe Up to 1 week! ‘Low’! 1
Encrypted information critical to business Critical to high priority functions! ‘High’! 3
Information loss Some loss acceptable with incremental backups! ‘Low’! 1
Affected devices Several desktops and shares on servers! ‘Low’! 1
Recovery time Up to 1 month! ‘Medium’! 2
Maximum value 3
Attack impact level High
Questions
Can you please comment on the volume of infection spread?
Did ransomware take advantage of the local user security context and only encrypted server shares?
Or did it spread across network, taking advantage of software vulnerabilities or weak admin passwords?
Did disruption to business continuity last for:
Up to 1 week
Up to 2 month
Several months or more
How much information was lost as a result of this attack?
No loss or some loss acceptable with incremental backups
Information loss affecting some critical business functions
Information loss affecting majority or all critical business functions
In your expert opinion, what was the severity of the consequence of this attack on victim organization (‘Low’,
‘Medium’, ‘High’)?
Why do you think so?
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Appendix 5: Criteria used to assess the security posture of organizations
The assessment of the security posture of organizations was
informed by a careful consideration of the organization’s level of
preparedness across a range of criteria, as shown in the taxonomy
below (based on Connolly and Wall [8]).
Appendix 6: Security posture exemplars
User security education 
     continuous 
     face-to-face, including presentations 
     make relevant 
     gradual introduction to security 
     consider senior members of staff 
     attract users to read documents 
     include annual exercises 
     examples with consequences 
     frequent reminders ‘call & verify’ 
     frequent bulletins ‘what is new’ 
Security policies and secure practices 
reporting instantly suspicious activity 
      shutting down devices 
      business-only use of devices 
      secure passwords  
      frequently checking security logs 
      regular scanning of all installed systems 
      formal agreements with partners 
Incident response strategy 
     communication plan  
     incident response plan 
     business continuity plan 
Technical measures 
     email hygiene  
     vulnerability management  
     upgrade management 
     advanced monitoring and detection 
     backups and recovery  
     web protection 
Network security  
network infrastructure 
     access control management 
     RDP maintenance 
Front-line management 
     security and IT knowledge 
     optimal utilisation of resources 
     cultivate culture and attitudes 
     the need for cyber security champions 
Enablers of change
Senior management 
      IT expertise 
      appreciation of IT 
Response tools
Strong Security Posture: LawEnfJ had partnerships with other organizations, which involved sharing some systems including e-mail. An employee
received a malicious e-mail into the external partner’s inbox and opened it on the machine belonging to LawEnfJ, infecting the network. An investiga-
tion revealed that the partner-organization did not have appropriate e-mail hygiene that could have stopped this e-mail from entering the inbox.
Nevertheless, LawEnfJ had an acute awareness of the ransomware threat and abundant knowledge on how to prevent and mitigate ransomware
attacks. When the ransomware hit, the organization responded timely and methodically. All systems and data were recovered over one weekend. Some
data were lost as part of the incremental backups practice, which is an acceptable industry practice. Following the attack, LawEnfJ instigated a formal
agreement with all external partners on minimal security measures that they must implement.
Medium Security Posture: GovSecJN had multiple layers of security controls to protect its business from cyberthreats. However, when the ransomware
attack took place, GovSecJN realized that some controls were not equipped to deal with the incident. For example, a communication plan did not
consider the fact that crypto-ransomware has the ability to encrypt systems, including e-mail, stripping organizations of the most common communi-
cation methods; business continuity plans did not take into consideration the loss of IT. Although all systems and data were restored in 1 week (from
backups), some critical services were unavailable for several days, inevitably affecting customers and staff. Following the attack, GovSecJN imple-
mented several changes, including updated communication and business continuity plans.
Weak Security Posture: EducInstFB had several serious network oversights (e.g. the lack of network visibility, a flat network structure, poor access con-
trol management, poor security practices, ineffective backups) that led to severe consequences, where crypto-ransomware infected the whole network
comprised hundreds of devices. Subsequently, many vital systems became unresponsive, crippling important business functions. A large amount of
data would have been lost as a result of this attack if the organization had not paid the ransom. The recovery process was very challenging and lasted
for months.
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Appendix 7: Profile of organizations
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